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INTRODUCTION 
Argentina is the South American republic 
whose society most resembles that of the United 
States. Both countries mastered a frontier, sub-
dued their native American inhabitants, expe-
rienced impressive economic growth and 
urbanization, welcomed large numbers of 
European immigrants, and produced huge agri-
cultural surpluses to sell abroad. These simi-
larities help explain why Lehigh students found 
their visit to the Argentine capital in August, 
1994, so enjoyable. It was also productive, 
because they then began the research that 
informs the following pages. The issues which 
the nine student contributors - all now uni-
versity graduates - analyze were a long time 
in the making, and the articles are part of a 
reevaluation of the nation's potential that has 
taken place in recent years. 
Argentina developed from the colonial Rfo 
de la Plata, whose capital was at Buenos Aires, 
and Tucuman and Paraguay. This region lacked 
mineral wealth, capital, and labor. It was under-
populated and impoverished. That it existed at 
all largely resulted from Spanish strategic con-
siderations and the struggle for empire. The 
rise of Argentina began with the creation of the 
viceroyalty of the Rfo de la Plata in 1776, which 
shifted the center from such interior regions as 
Salta, Jujuy, and Tucuman to Buenos Aires. 
The achievement of independence 
between 1810-1820 did little to develop the 
region, although the cattle economy of Buenos 
Aires and the coast prospered when local lead-
ers abolished Spanish trade prohibitions and 
constructed meat-salting plants. During the 
independence struggles of the 1810s, such 
regions as La Rioja, Santiago del Estero, and 
Santa Fe disputed the claims of Buenos Aires to 
dominate the nation, while the interior 
economies suffered from ruinous outside com-
petition. In the port city, however, foreign mer-
chants became more important, and ties with 
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Britain and continental Europe began to form. 
The colonial pattern of importing finished 
goods and exporting primary products became 
a fixture of the national era too. Foreign invest-
ment, whose modern manifestations Christine 
Massey has ably analyzed in "The Evolution of 
Multinational Corporate Investment in 
Argentina," became an avenue to success for 
Argentines with connections to the North 
Atlantic world. For those hurt by foreign com-
petition, European penetration was a curse and 
led to anti-foreign sentiments that survived into 
the late twentieth century. 
In the 1820s, divisions among Argentines, 
then citizens of the United Provinces, widened, and 
civil wars resulted. Men fought over whether to 
organize the country along unitary or federal lines, 
but the nation remained without organization. In 
1829, Juan Manuel de Rosas, a wealthy landown-
er and one of the memorable dictators of Latin 
America, became governor of Buenos Aires, a posi-
tion he held with only a two-year interruption until 
1852. He represented conservative interests of the 
coast, privately preferred Spanish overlordship, but 
publicly espoused nativism and opposition to 
Britain and France. While in fact protecting the 
foreign community of Buenos Aires, mostly mer-
chants, he offered to sell the Islas Malvinas/ 
Falkland Islands to the British, who refused to pay 
for territories that they already possessed. A 
parochial tyrant, Rosas opposed organizing the 
nation, but ironically he laid the foundation for 
national organization by his opponents. They took 
power in the 1860s and began to build Argentina, 
making Buenos Aires the political and the eco-
nomic center of the nation. 
The heartland of Argentina and the basis 
for its nineteenth-century reputation as a land 
of limitless wealth were the riches of the pam-
pas of the east central region, including Buenos 
Aires and parts of La Pampa, Cordoba, and Santa 
Fe provinces. The cattle and sheep economy of 
the early 1800s and the agricultural revolution 
in crop farming after 1870 made Argentina into 
one of the richest countries in the world by the 
early 1900s. Acquiring such new products and 
techniques as barbed wire for fencing on the 
treeless pampas and refrigeration for beef and 
mutton foreshadowed the modern policies 
toward outside technologies that David Slomsky 
outlines in "The Development of a New 
Technological Infrastructure in Argentina." 
Foreign capital fueled Argentine growth. 
Nevertheless, burdensome obligations to cred-
itors overseas threatened to bankrupt the 
nation in 1890, an early example of the phe-
nomenon that Art Comstock subjects to a 
sophisticated analysis in "The Debt Crisis." The 
rush of immigrants to Argentina, mostly from 
southern Europe, provided laborers and trans-
formed the ethnic composition of the nation. 
The construction of railroads, largely financed 
by British capital , catalyzed the economic 
growth that produced great fortunes for a few 
and a better life for many. 
Under the liberal presidents of the con-
solidated nation, Bartolome Mitre and Domingo 
Faustino Sarmiento in the 1860s and 1870s and 
such later leaders as Julio A. Roca and Carlos 
Pelligrini, the government generally chose not 
to intervene in the economy. It ignored the 
protests of urban lower classes, and of humble 
persons in rural areas as well, although rural 
Argentina was never a peasant society. With 
prosperity resting on solid ties with European 
capital and markets, conservative governments 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies refused to protect local industries. 
A middle-class opposition to the conserva-
tive direction of the nation developed around the 
Radical Party, neither a worker's vehicle nor a 
voice of social revolution. Aided by an electoral 
law of 1912 that broadened the franchise, the 
Radicals and Hipolito Yrigoyen took power in 
1916. They slowly shifted from the politics of 
the past toward greater popular participation. 
But they largely ignored the demands of labor. 
When proletarians turned to anarchist and 
socialist solutions; the government and employ-
ers ' organizations responded to strikes with 
repression, especially in 1918-1919. The strikes 
of that period were precursors of the political 
upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s that Tina 
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Niedzwiecki confronts in "The Reconciliation in 
Argentina: Is It Complete?" Under Radical gov-
ernments in the 1920s, economic nationalism 
found its first serious expression in the creation 
of YPF, the state oil company. It aimed at con-
trolling or expelling then dominant foreign com-
petitors like Standard Oil and eventually came 
to symbolize Argentine economic nationalism. 
Beginning in 1929, the Great Depression 
staggered Argentina. Although its economy, 
based on the production and sale of such essen-
tial commodities as meats and grains, suffered 
less than Latin American producers of coffee 
and sugar, the damage was significant. Led by 
the now aged Yrigoyen, who had returned to 
the presidency in 1928, the civilian government 
appeared inept and unprepared to deal with the 
crisis. In 1930, the military, whose leaders dis-
trusted democracy itself, stepped in. Led by 
General Jose Uriburu, they removed a sitting 
president for the first time in Argentine histo-
ry. This coup opened a fifty-year period in 
which the military either ruled the nation or 
threatened uncooperative civilian leaders with 
overthrow. The military were themselves divid-
ed and unable to decide whether they wanted a 
regime like Benito Mussolini's or a restoration 
of the old oligarchy. In the 1930s, they tried 
first the one and then the other. A civilian 
regime lasted until 1943, when the military 
again intervened. In the next two years, Colonel 
Juan Domingo Peron made himself the strong 
man of the military junta. In one way or anoth-
er, he and his followers dominated or paralyzed 
the nation until his death in 1974. 
Elected president in 1946 despite the hos-
tility of the United States, Peron transformed 
Argentina. He strengthened the military. His 
advanced social welfare measures benefitted 
organized labor and the Argentine poor, but his 
redistribution of the nation's wealth masked the 
onset of a half century of economic stagnation. 
The Peron regime deepened the divisions with-
in the body politic. Peron and his charismatic 
second wife, Eva Duarte, improved health care 
for the poor. They created free clinics, whose 
aftermath Chris Cavgnaro examines in "Health 
Concerns in Argentina," and they won the last-
ing gratitude of those whose lives these reforms 
touched. Peron also sponsored and benefitted 
from a law granting women the vote. Long 
advocated by Argentine feminists, this law and 
the public presence of Evita, as she was known, 
initiated the participation of women in the 
political and the economic life of the nation, a 
story which Amy Marx brings up to date in 
"Women in the Argentine Labor Force." Peron 
also created state agencies to direct develop-
ment, and their proliferation over the years 
eventually choked the economy. State enter-
prises eventually became top-heavy. A nation-
al consensus developed over the need to priva-
tize them in the 1980s and 1990s, which Caren 
L. Strauss discusses in "The Transformation of 
the Argentine Economy: The Privatization and 
Convertibility Programs." One goal of the 
Peronista program was to achieve national eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, which Kevin Kniffen 
mentions in "To Fish or Not to Fish: Playing the 
Game of International Development." 
Weakened by an economic depression in 
the early 1950s and the loss of Evita to cancer, 
Peron alienated former supporters among 
Catholics by proposing to legalize divorce. 
Waffling on his once-cherished program of eco-
nomic nationalism by negotiating with 
American oil companies, Peron succumbed to 
military opponents in 1955. They removed him 
from office and sent him into exile. 
As the economic problems of Argentina 
multiplied in the 1950s and 1960s, citizens 
grew accustomed to periods of horrendous 
inflation. Neo-liberal attempts to divest the 
nation of responsibilities for which it could not 
pay are usually associated with the military gov-
ernments that interrupted civilian rule, espe-
cially those of 1966-73 and 1976-83. Many offi-
cers believed that civilian politics itself, 
including deal-making and compromise, was 
essentially corrupt. They encouraged civilians 
to behave like soldiers and to obey. The down-
ward economic spiral, however, was something 
that even the military could not control. When 
an aged Juan Peron returned to the presidency 
in 1973, he was the hope of the nation. He was 
now all things to all people, but he died in July, 
1974, leaving the government in the hands of 
his inexperienced third wife, Isabelita, then the 
vice president. 
By 1970, Argentina was drifting into civil 
war. Middle-class youth with university back-
grounds aimed to socialize the nation, some 
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behind the Peronist banner and others as oppo-
nents of Peronism. They took the violent trail 
that the military had blazed. They executed 
policemen and army officers, including former 
president Pedro E. Aramburu, and kidnapped 
and held for ransom national and foreign busi-
nessmen. Women were prominent among these 
urban guerrillas, a new phenomenon. President 
Peron ordered security forces to subdue them, 
a campaign that reached previously unknown 
heights of savagery under the military govern-
ment headed by Jorge Videla after 1976. 
In that year, most Argentines welcomed 
the military takeover and the removal of the 
unfortunate Mrs. Peron from office, but the gen-
erals wore out their welcome. Insisting on sum-
mary justice for internal enemies, they execut-
ed opponents or presumed opponents without 
trial. They often tortured those whom they 
abducted. Like their civilian predecessors, they 
too lost control of the economy that they had 
tried to reform. Although real problems con-
fronted them, including the environmental 
degradation that Bernadette Ryan addresses in 
"The Development of Environmental Policy in 
Argentina," military leaders sought a quick fix 
to strengthen their increasingly tenuous hold 
on the nation. They made a bid to recapture 
public esteem. In 1982, they occupied the Islas 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands, a source of friction 
between Argentina and Britain since 1833. 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent the 
British forces that easily recaptured the islands, 
and the military was discredited. They had 
shown themselves incapable of holding the 
islands, even with a force numerically superior 
to that of the British. The loss of legitimacy was 
completed when the trials of leading generals in 
the 1980s revealed the extent of their brutality. 
When the Radical Raul Alfonsfn became 
president in 1983, he set about rebuilding the 
political and economic fabric of the nation. His 
most notable act was to oversee the convictions 
of generals responsible for the atrocities of the 
"Dirty War." He succeeded in restoring democ-
racy but failed to improve the shattered econo-
my. When the former Peronist governor of La 
Rioja, Carlos Saul Menem, was elected president 
in 1989, the besieged Alfonsfn gave over the office 
to his successor six months ahead of schedule. 
Menem became president at a time when 
the faith in governments everywhere to improve 
economic conditions had eroded. Early in his 
presidency, the Soviet Union and the socialist 
governments of Eastern Europe disappeared. 
These as yet under-examined influences on 
Latin America strengthened the hand of advo-
cates of neo-liberal solutions. Under Menem, 
even the Peronists, once the champions of state 
intervention in the economy and import-sub-
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stitution industrialization, had become expo-
nents of privatization. How lasting these 
changes will be, we will discover in the future, 
but such inquiries as the following articles will 
help us to understand the new directions. 
James Schofield Saeger 
Professor of History 
